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Party politics across Central and eastern europe has become less structured. Many of 
the divides that anchored political competition have waned in recent years, weakening 
the attachment of voters to the existing palette of parties and making them more likely 
to be attracted to new and non-traditional electoral vehicles. But for such parties to 
succeed at the ballot box, they need to be able to frame elections and campaign effec-
tively. Drawing on data from a specially commissioned survey, we find that the success 
of Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) led by Igor Matovič in the 
2020 parliamentary elections in Slovakia owed much to the crafting of an anti-corrup-
tion appeal combined with an effective campaign. Both mobilization and conversion of 
voters, particularly through television and the leaders’ debates, in the months leading 
up to election day ensured OĽaNO won a quarter of the vote. OĽaNO stands in stark 
contrast to other parties whose leaders failed to craft as effective a message, miscalcu-
lated the impact of electoral rules and in some cases were unable to distance themselves 
enough from their past actions. The success of OĽaNO underlines that themes related 
to anti-corruption and good governance have become central to party politics and 
political contestation. More broadly, the election and its aftermath continued a general 
trend of forward movement of voters from old parties to new to newer still, indicating 
the churn of party politics in Slovakia is likely to continue.
Keywords: party politics; elections; campaigning; Slovakia; new parties
Introduction
Party politics across Central and eastern europe is striking for both its continui-
ties and change. On the one hand, elections frequently throw up new parties that are 
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often able to ride an electoral vehicle fuelled by anti-corruption, celebrity, and their 
appeal of newness to achieve (some degree of) success at the ballot box. But politics 
is also characterized by perennial issues and deep divides linked to ethnicity and 
different visions of socio-economic organization and distribution. The former high-
lights institutional fluidity, whereas the latter underscores the deeper fault-lines that 
shape the geomorphology of politics.1
The 2020 parliamentary elections in Slovakia illustrated both continuities and 
change. Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé 
osobnosti [OĽaNO]) led by Igor Matovič, which had been seemingly stuck in the 
doldrums in late 2019 and looked as if it might fail to cross the electoral threshold, 
stormed the boards a few months later in February’s election, winning a quarter of 
the vote. Whilst OĽaNO’s support rose, parties in the governing coalition could only 
muster a combined total of just 23.6 percent of the vote. Moreover, following the 
pattern of almost all parliamentary elections in Slovakia, 2020 saw not just some 
parliamentary parties fail to muster enough support to survive, but new entrants gar-
ner significant slices of the vote, one of which won enough votes to enter parliament 
and become part of the new government (see Table 1). Furthermore, with one notable 
exception, all the parties in the new parliament had contested their first general elec-
tion within the previous decade. In addition, even the oldest party in the new parlia-
ment witnessed a significant fission soon after the election, with many of its 
prominent members creating a new party led by a former prime minister.
and yet, there were notable continuities. Socio-economic, geographical, cultural, 
and ethnic divisions still mattered for sizeable parts of the electorate. even in the 
changes we see evidence of recurring patterns, the stable instability of party politics 
in Slovakia,2 not just with another iteration of the steady entrance and exit of parties 
but also in the movement of voters from new to newer parties. Moreover, political 
contestation was striking for the sharp division between the parties in government 
and those in the opposition camps, the latest iteration of a perennial theme of party 
politics in Slovakia.
This article has three main goals. Firstly, it provides an account of the election, 
particularly the success of OĽaNO. We maintain that the results underline larger 
trends across not just Central and eastern europe (Cee) but democracies on a wider 
geographical canvas. Matovič’s achievement highlights that although success on 
the battlefield of politics may be impacted by the terrain (itself shaped by the under-
lying political geology) of overall patterns of divisions and contestation, victory or 
defeat is also shaped by the response and choices of parties and their leaders to the 
opportunities presented to them. Secondly, drawing in particular on data from a 
specially commissioned poll, we examine the impact of campaigning. electoral 
results are driven by both the fundamentals and the fickle. Fundamental divisions 
linked to sociological characteristics, socio-economic appeals, and cultural values 
may form the bedrock of support for many parties, but voters are open to persua-
sion—meaning that campaigning has the possibility to play a significant role and 
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making campaigning choices potentially decisive in determining electoral out-
comes. The 2020 election indicates the importance of the campaign in shifting vot-
ers, but even in an era of digital technology it shows that television rather than 
social media remains the primary source of information for voters. Thirdly, given 
the salience of new party appeals, we examine not just the power of a newness 
appeal in contemporary politics, but also chart new voter movements. Our analysis 
indicates that in a similar vein to other countries in the region such as Slovenia and 
the Czech Republic, there is a general trend of forward movement of voters from 
old parties to new to newer still. In the Slovak case, however, there is some move-
ment back to an older party but the “older” party, in question had participated in 
only two previous elections and, thanks to its marginalization during the previous 
parliaments, could still plausibly cast itself as not yet having had a chance to dem-
onstrate its potential for change.
We begin by placing the election within the wider trends of party politics particu-
larly the changing bases of party competition in Cee. We then analyse the election 
campaign highlighting the salience of particular issues like corruption, but also the 
consequences of certain choices. The final part of the article focuses not just on the 
role newness plays in voter perception and party appeals, but also the flow of voters 
from established to newer parties.
Changing Patterns of Party Politics
In the three decades since the 1989 revolutions, electoral politics across Cee has 
been marked by high levels of volatility, and party politics has been characterized by 
fluidity. although some parties have managed to endure, many others have been 
ephemeral: living fast and dying young.
The academic literature explaining the (in)stability of party politics tends to fall 
into one of four categories: historical, sociological, institutional, and strategic.3 By 
drawing on the power of communist legacies or the exit from communism, histori-
cal accounts offered valuable insights in the first post-communist decade in Cee, 
but their explanatory power has faded as the forty years of communist rule has 
moved further away from the present. In the case of Slovakia, it was arguably more 
the exit from the Czechoslovak federation in the early 1990s that played a more 
significant role in shaping political contestation. Indeed, until the 2000s politics was 
dominated by themes related to the nation, illiberalism, and Slovakia’s place in the 
world. The central questions of politics in this period centred around what is the 
nation, who belongs, what kind of regime citizens wanted, and the country’s geopo-
litical orientation.4 The nationalist, nationally inclined, and illiberal forces mostly 
concentrated in the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by Vladimír 
Mečiar and the Slovak National Party (SNS) faced off against a changing array of 
parties which eventually came together in the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) 
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and a wider governing coalition to remove HZDS and SNS from power in 1998 and 
confirm the country’s geopolitical orientation.5 From the early 2000s, however, 
party competition revolved much more around socio-economic issues, particularly 
how to organize the economy to deliver prosperity and how the fruits of economic 
success should be distributed throughout society,6 although national questions were 
far from absent.
Sociological accounts based on cleavages have long provided the frameworks to 
explain party politics in democracies, but even those who use such approaches for 
longer-established democracies in Western europe have identified new cleavages 
and divides to explain the patterns of political contestation.7 Deep sociological divi-
sions clearly play a role in shaping party politics in Cee, especially ethnic politics. 
Slovakia’s ethnic Hungarian population amounting to close to a tenth of the popula-
tion has tended to vote en masse for parties who make a clear pitch to defend the 
interests of that minority. Moreover, support for parties like HZDS and SNS, and in 
more recent times the far-right People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) have been 
built—at least in part—on attitudes towards the ethnic Hungarian and Roma minori-
ties. Furthermore, the divisions linked to contrasts between conservative and liberal 
views of culture, morality, and the nation which have been represented in party com-
petition can be tied back to the church–state cleavage identified by Lipset and Rokkan 
in their landmark study. Nonetheless, as even advocates of cleavage-based approaches 
argue, in a true Rokkanian sense it is hard to identify such cleavages in Cee. Indeed, 
the most persuasive accounts in this tradition temper the structural determinism by 
acknowledging the role of agency.8
Institutional frameworks, particularly the choice of electoral system, are also seen 
to shape party politics. While majoritarian and plurality systems in countries like the 
United States and the United Kingdom help entrench the two-party system and make 
it harder for other parties to break through, more proportional systems, such as 
Slovakia’s list-based PR system with a 5 per cent threshold, are expected to be more 
likely to foster multi-party systems and more permissive to new party breakthrough. 
But the fact they can foster both long-standing and short-lived parties underlines that 
electoral systems provide incentives and disincentives that political actors can choose 
to follow or not.
although explanations drawing on historical, sociological, and institutional fac-
tors offer some analytical leverage, the limitations of those accounts point to the 
importance of choices made by politicians and parties. In their compelling account of 
the rise of challenger parties in Western europe, De Vries and Hobolt, for instance, 
argue that political change is best seen as a battle between the forces of dominance 
and innovation. Drawing on the experiences in the business world, they show how 
the attempts by firms to maintain their dominant position are challenged by newcom-
ers. Parties in the oligopoly do not all perish or prosper, but their fate is contingent 
on the choices made by political actors. De Vries and Hobolt’s account underline 
why challenger parties can be successful even in party systems with histories of 
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stability and deep partisan attachments. given the shorter history of democracies and 
weaker levels of partisanship in Cee, we would expect the odds of success for chal-
lenger parties to be higher.
Strategic models highlight the salience of strategies adopted by parties to ensure 
endurance and enhance or hamper new party emergence. Many of the most compel-
ling accounts of the dynamics of party politics in Latin america, Western europe, 
and Cee, for instance, have stressed how decisions to build and maintain organiza-
tional structures have aided endurance.9 Moreover, scholarship has shown how the 
appeals at the heart of a party’s pitch to the electorate matters. ethnic-based appeals 
or those based on the defence of socially conservative values can constitute a “party 
brand” that helps survival even when performance in office is poor,10 whereas other 
appeals like anti-corruption may be easy to invoke, but harder to claim and develop 
long-term issue ownership.
The theme of corruption has become a significant driver of politics across Cee 
often tied to appeals linked to competence and novelty.11 In Poland, for instance, the 
liberal–conservative rivalry between Civic Platform and Law and Justice that has 
shaped party competition in the past decade and a half owes much to the dramatic 
decline of the once popular Polish socialists whose support slumped thanks to a com-
bination of questions of corruption and competence.12 In Hungary, the electoral dom-
inance of Fidesz may be due in recent times to the playing of the national card and 
the curbing of liberal democratic norms and practices, but the initial change in 
Hungary’s stable two party competition owed much to the collapse in support for the 
Hungarian Socialists thanks to questions related to their integrity and competence.13 
In the Czech Republic, party politics was dominated by left–right competition, but 
both the Civic Democrats and Social Democrats paid a heavy price for their associa-
tion with various corruption scandals, which fuelled the rise of parties proclaiming 
their cleanliness and competence, particularly aNO, founded and led by the busi-
nessman andrej Babis.14
The empirical patterns in the other Visegrád 4 countries underline the changing 
spatial nature of party competition. The breakdown of once strong opponents not 
only forces the other side to identify other enemies or themes in order to mobilize 
their voters but the collapse helps create room for other parties to emphasize alterna-
tive issues and divisions. Cultural and national themes have been part of the success-
ful recipes for well-established parties and some new entrants not just in Cee but on 
a wider geographical canvas. But drawing on the well of scandals, new parties and 
those without experience of government have placed competence and anti-corrup-
tion at the heart of their pitch to voters. Stressing these valence themes not only helps 
distinguish the new(er) entrants and challengers from governing parties in an era 
where spatial differences between parties on the socio-economic dimension may be 
far less pronounced, they provide an appealing pitch to disgruntled voters.15
Since the early 1990s governments of all different hues in Slovakia have been 
implicated in corruption scandals, with friends and associates of the politicians in 
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power profiting from their connections.16 Corruption has been a perennial theme of 
party politics provoking politicians to paint their rivals as less than angelic white and 
galvanizing citizens to demonstrate such as after the revelations in the gorilla file in 
the early 2010s.17 Questions revolving around how to run the country better and how 
(or even whether) to break up networks of power and influence became even more 
prominent in the 2016–2020 parliamentary term. In particular, the murder of the 
journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in 2018 provoked a series 
of demonstrations across the country against the Direction–Social Democracy 
(Smer–sociálna demokracia [Smer-SD]) government led by Robert Fico. The inves-
tigations into the deaths exposed links between politicians, powerful business inter-
ests, and organs of the state, leading to the resignation of the interior and prime 
ministers, although Fico remained as party leader. The widespread disgust over the 
corrupt behaviour highlighted by the Kuciak and Kušnírová murders was a major 
factor in an outsider, Zuzana Čaputová, winning election to Slovakia’s largely cere-
monial presidency in 2019. Čaputová’s recipe of novelty and cleanliness was a varia-
tion on the pitch andrej Kiska had made five years previously to defeat Fico for the 
presidency.18
as Slovakia geared up for the 2020 elections, therefore, the terrain of party com-
petition appeared to be changing. In more volatile political environments, elections 
provide opportunities for new entrants or previously more minor parties on the politi-
cal stage to mobilize voters through campaigning and hence can be both reflective of, 
and catalysts for, change.
Campaigning: Mobilization and Conversion
The academic literature on elections and campaigning is vast assessing both 
impact and types of campaigning.19 It is, however, predominantly focused on the 
United States, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom, with the countries of 
Central and eastern europe largely neglected.20 In terms of impact, in well-estab-
lished party systems with deep ties of group identity and partisanship campaigning 
is often seen as having only a marginal impact, albeit that the successful shifting of 
those few marginal voters during a campaign can be decisive. Thanks to the shorter 
length of democratic experience (for both voters and parties) and/or the roller-
coaster ride of politics in three decades since the establishment of democracy voters 
in Cee are thought to have weaker ties to parties. Indeed, the main exit poll con-
ducted for Markíza TV of the Slovak elections indicated the loyalty levels of voters 
(comparing whom they voted for in 2016 and 2020) does not exceed two-thirds for 
any party21; following trends in previous elections.22 even OĽaNO, whose support 
more than doubled in 2020 only managed to hold on to 65.2 percent of its voters 
from 2016. given those weaker bonds, we would expect the campaign to have an 
impact on the election outcome.
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Central to campaigning are the overlapping tasks of mobilization and conversion. 
In all elections voters need to be mobilized to turn out to cast their ballots for their 
preferred choice (or dissuaded from voting for opponents), but in more fluid party 
systems like Slovakia, where partisan ties are weaker, voter preferences are more 
labile and open to persuasion; hence, conversion of voters to support a particular 
party or candidate becomes a key task to be undertaken before, or in conjunction 
with, mobilization. The exact blend of mobilization and conversion varies not just 
across party systems, but also between different parties within those systems. 
Nevertheless, political operatives have long stressed the key to successful cam-
paigns—in terms of both mobilization and conversion—can be boiled down to two 
components: framing the election around a key theme and projecting your party and 
candidate as the one to deliver on that theme.23
In terms of the modes, one of the few studies that has sought to provide a com-
parative analysis of campaigning in Cee found, perhaps rather surprisingly, that 
there was not much of a difference between older and newer parties in terms of the 
types of communication tools used, especially in terms of new media use, and that 
the main forms of party contact were by leaflets, mail, or face-to-face contact with 
much lower scores for social media. Nonetheless, given that the study was based on 
data from 2011–2016, the authors concluded by expecting an increase in importance 
in social media in future elections.24
This article draws on the findings of a post-election poll we commissioned from 
the leading Slovak polling agency, FOCUS. The survey data were collected between 
11 and 17 March 2020 (in the immediate aftermath of the election) with a representa-
tive sample of 1,013 voters. We recognize the weaknesses of survey-based data and 
acknowledge it has become popular in campaigning studies, particularly in the 
United States, to conduct experiments.25 Such tools can leverage significant insights, 
but even well-designed experiments tend to offer only glimpses of what may be hap-
pening on the wider national scale and outside a controlled environment. In contrast, 
nationwide surveys of a representative sample of voters provide a broader numerical 
and geographical basis for claims about national elections.
FOCUS used a stratified random sampling process. In the first stage, the agency 
divided the population into regions and then settlement size.26 In the second stage, 
they then used stratified sampling by quotas (gender, age, education, and national-
ity). We recognize that panel data can provide useful insights in survey-based analy-
ses, but given that the landscape of political parties in Slovakia has changed 
considerably over time, cross-sectional data should be the first choice. Moreover, it 
is appropriate to use this form of data given that our primary focus is to explain the 
outcome of a specific election. We acknowledge that future studies would benefit 
from a combination of cross-sectional and panel data blended with well-crafted 
experiments and encourage funding bodies to support such data collection exercises. 
In this study, we combined the findings of our survey with the findings of other sur-
veys, analysis of manifestos, campaign materials, and first-hand observation of cam-
paign activities across the length and breadth of the country.
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Campaigning and Positioning: How Ordinary People Win
In the autumn of 2019, OĽaNO was languishing in the polls scarcely 1 percentage 
point above the 5 percent electoral threshold and on the decline (see Figure 1). How 
then to explain the party’s stunning success just a few months later when it mopped 
up a quarter of the vote? Part of the explanation lies with the choices made by other 
parties and part lies with the choices made by OĽaNO. We begin with the latter.
OĽaNO began life in 2010. Igor Matovič had become wealthy through his com-
pany Regionpress, which published local free weeklies. alongside advertisements 
paid for by local businesses, Matovič penned articles with corruption as a common 
theme.27 With three others he formed a civic grouping, Ordinary People, which had 
political aspirations. In the run-up to the 2010 elections, Matovič struck a deal with 
Richard Sulík, the leader of a newly formed party Freedom and Solidarity (SaS). In 
return for SaS being given significant space in the Regionpress publications, Matovič 
and his allies were granted the last four places on the electoral list. Thanks to prefer-
ence voting—actively advocated in Regionpress circulars—all four were elected 
Figure 1
Opinion polling for selected parties and first and second place parties  
in polls, July 2018 to December 2020
Source: Poll of Polls, https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/slovakia/
Smer-SD OĽaNO
SaS PS+Spolu ZĽ Smer-SD
Hlas














































Source: Poll of Polls, https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/slovakia/
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over the heads of nearly 150 people on the party list. Nonetheless, because of 
Matovič’s unwillingness always to follow the SaS party line, relations between 
Matovič and SaS soon deteriorated, leading to him being thrown out of the parlia-
mentary caucus and culminating in the decision to form a new party, OĽaNO, in 
2011 as Slovakia geared up for early elections. In those elections (2012), OĽaNO 
won 8.6 percent of the vote and 16 seats. Throughout the remainder of the decade, 
the party experienced much churn with many politicians elected on its list leaving the 
parliamentary group, but it maintained its parliamentary presence.
Matovič became a prominent figure on the political stage, derided by opponents 
as a clown for his high-profile publicity-seeking stunts, but the crude language and 
raucous style in which he conducted his relentless attacks helped identify him as a 
fighter against corruption, double standards, and hypocrisy in politics. OĽaNO’s 
leader directed much of his fire at Robert Fico and Smer-SD. Matovič was frequently 
seen in parliament bedecked in a T-shirt emblazoned with the slogan “Fico protects 
thieves” and carried out some of his most high-profile stunts outside buildings asso-
ciated with Smer-SD’s leader including the apartment complex where Fico rented a 
flat from a businessman accused of tax fraud.28
as mentioned above, political operatives have longed stressed the key to success-
ful campaigns can be boiled down to two components: framing the election around a 
key theme and projecting your party and candidate as the one to deliver on that 
theme. In 2020, Matovič managed to do both and was rewarded at the ballot box. 
Before turning to OĽaNO’s strategy we first examine the broader processes of mobi-
lization and conversion.
Data from our specially commissioned poll indicates that the campaign mattered. 
Over half the respondents (55.2 percent) answered that the campaign convinced 
them to participate in the election with 27.8 percent completely agreeing the cam-
paign had persuaded them and 27.4 percent somewhat agreeing. We then asked 
respondents who voted in the election where they got their information about politi-
cal parties and what forms of party communication had the greatest impact on their 
decision to vote for a particular party. as Tables 2 and 3 show television was the main 
source of information with social media and party communications also important. 
given those figures, it is perhaps not surprising that when asked what form of com-
munication from parties had the greatest impact on voters’ decision, respondents 
mentioned the pre-election debates and debates in the media.
Matovič placed corruption and good governance at the heart of his campaign. 
Drawing on the pool of support that had long considered corruption a problem in 
Slovak society29—a pool that had been plenished by the scandals of the 2016–2020 
Smer-SD government—OĽaNO’s anti-corruption appeal was key to its success. 
During the campaign Matovič continued his habit of high-profile stunts, including a 
trip to Cannes where he put signs on the fence surrounding the villa of Ján Počiatek 
stating, “Property of the Slovak Republic,” to publicize the dubious wealth of the 
former Smer-SD finance minister. These stunts helped reinforce in the minds of the 
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public Matovič’s position as the chief critic of corruption committed not just during 
the 2016–2020 government’s watch, but over the past decade. The framing of the 
election around corruption and making OĽaNO the vehicle to root out corruption is 
also in evidence in the party’s manifesto. Indeed, the first theme the OĽaNO mani-
festo covers is the battle against corruption. Moreover, in the opening eleven sen-
tences of the manifesto in the “Who We are” section, the first statement declares that 
for “ten years we have fought courageously against corruption,” the seventh stresses 
Table 2
Where Voters Got Their Information About Political Parties  
(Respondents Could Choose up to Two)
Source of information % of respondents
Television 71.3
Social Media 33.0
Parties and Candidates’ Own Material
(billboards, leaflets, party websites, etc.)
23.7
Newspapers and websites of news outlets (e.g., Nový čas, Pravda, Sme, 
Denník N, www.aktuality.sk, www.sme.sk, www.topky.sk, etc.)
22.8
Radio 19.6
The “alternative web” (parlamentnelisty.sk, hlavnespravy.sk) 6.1
Other sources (family, friends, acquaintances, etc.) 2.2
Don’t know 0.4
Source: FOCUS Poll, 11-17 March 2020.
Note: Question: “Z akých zdrojov ste predovšetkým čerpali informácie o politických stranách a kandidá-
toch? Vyberte najviac dva.”
Table 3
Type of Party Communication Which Had the Greatest Impact When Voters 
Made Their Decision
Communication from Parties % of respondents
Pre-election debates / debates in the media 63.5
Posts of leaders of parties on social media 16.3
Personal meetings/interactions with party activists 
(on the street, party meetings and rallies, etc.)
11.6
Leaflets / party newspapers 5.5
Billboards 1.6
Don’t know 1.5
Source: FOCUS Poll, 11-17 March 2020.
Note: Question: “aký typ komunikácie strany, ktorú ste vo voľbách volili, mal najväčší vplyv na Vaše 
rozhodnutie, že ju budete voliť?”
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that “no oligarchs stand behind us,” the ninth that they will “not allow anyone to 
steal” (directed not at petty criminals, but the plunderers of the state), and the tenth 
that “property stolen by politicians we will return to the people.”30 The wider themes 
of good (and effective) governance are in evidence not just in the second main sec-
tion of the manifesto under the label “a State That Serves,” amounting to 70 of the 
manifesto’s 210 pages, but also in the “Who are We” section stressing the party’s 
veracity, activity, and “excellent programme full of excellent solutions which will 
help people.”
given this pitch, it is no surprise that exit polls indicated that 69.4 percent of 
OĽaNO voters cast their ballots for Matovič’s party because of its stance on 
corruption31—a finding also confirmed in our poll. Voters were asked how much 
certain themes (anti-corruption stance of the party, the newness of the party, the eco-
nomic programme of the party, the ability of the party to defend “our nation,” the 
party’s promotion of traditional values, the party’s defence of the environment, and 
the convincing performance of the leader in the pre-election TV debates) had 
impacted on their choice to vote for the party they eventually chose. We then aggre-
gated the scores for each party and created an average of low-to-high impact stan-
dardized on a 0.0–1.0 scale. as Table 4 shows, OĽaNO’s score of 0.89 for its 
anti-corruption stance (both the highest anti-corruption score for any party and the 
highest score for any issue among OĽaNO voters) indicates anti-corruption was not 
just very important for its voters, but overall more important than other themes for its 
voters, and of greater importance to its voters than to other parties, albeit that anti-
corruption was important for voters across the political spectrum.
The battle against corruption was central to the election. Matovič’s framing of the 
election around combating corruption meant defeating Smer-SD, and he projected 
himself and his party as the best vehicle to remove Smer-SD from power. There was 
a clear momentum towards OĽaNO during the campaign indicating a successful 
process of conversion. In our specially commissioned poll, 15.8 percent of voters 
admitted to switching their votes in the month before the election and of those 41 
percent shifted to supporting OĽaNO, a figure four times higher than for any other 
party. Of those voters who moved to Matovič’s party 22 percent came from Za Ľudí 
and 20 percent from PS-Spolu (two new electoral vehicles we discuss below). 
Unsurprisingly, only 4 percent came from those who were considering voting for 
Smer-SD a month before the election. Our analysis of the data indicates that the pro-
file of those who switched to OĽaNO during the campaign was similar to those who 
had planned to vote for OĽaNO before the campaign began. It suggests that voters 
switched less because they cared more about corruption, but rather in a bandwagon 
effect saw OĽaNO as the best vehicle to remove corrupt politicians from power. The 
final stages of OĽaNO’s campaign with billboards imploring citizens to “decide” and 
adverts on radio and TV stressing the need to turn out pointed to a mobilization strat-
egy akin to classic get Out the Vote campaigns.32 But the most striking event was a 
facebook interview Matovič conducted with his daughter on 24 February just days 
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before the end of the campaign.33 after evading the question for months and hinting 
others would be better suited for the role even if OĽaNO won, he finally acknowl-
edged he would be willing to be prime minister. Not only did this dominate the news 
cycle and helped cement Matovič’s position as Smer-SD’s main opponent, but it left 
little time for prime minister Peter Pellegrini and Fico to reorient their attacks towards 
the dangers of a Matovič-led government.
Matovič’s decision to frame the election about corruption and defeating Smer-SD 
was clearly a major factor in OĽaNO’s success, but other choices linked to the elec-
toral system augmented the success. as mentioned above, OĽaNO has a history of 
using effectively the mechanics of the electoral system, particularly linked to the 
open list system. Preference voting allows citizens to express preferences for up to 
four candidates, and candidates who win over 3 percent of the party’s total vote get 
bumped to the top of the list. Matovič placed himself in last place (150) with other 
prominent OĽaNO parliamentarians at the bottom of the list, thereby freeing up 
places higher up the list (and hence more electable) for others. In the “who we are” 
section of the manifesto, the party proclaimed the “honourableness” of this decision. 
In the end, Matovič and six others from the last places on the list ended up getting 
elected, but the overwhelming majority of new MPs were elected from the first four 
dozen places on the electoral list. Indeed, Matovič was able to make a virtue out of a 
weakness. OĽaNO’s parliamentary groupings in both 2012–2016 and 2016–2020 
had been notoriously fractious with many departures. By the time of the 2020 elec-
tion, for instance, only nine MPs of the nineteen elected on the OĽaNO ticket four 
years previously remained in the party, freeing up space on the electoral list and 
allowing him to project the party as led by a “new team, with new hopes and new 
faces,”34 and some of the party’s most prominent billboards proclaimed “the best 
candidate list is OĽaNO’s.”
Integral to OĽaNO’s success in 2020 was a decision to offer places on its list to 
groups and prominent individuals popular in their respective professional and local 
communities. Indeed, the formal full name of the list Obyčajní Ľudia a nezávislé 
osobnosti, NOVA, Kresťanská únia (KÚ), Zmena Zdola (Ordinary People and 
Independent Personalities, New, Christian Union, Change from Below) indicates the 
extent to which Matovič reached out to others to join him on the ticket. The list 
included a well-known comedian, an investigator into the gorilla corruption scandal, 
a tennis player, and a hardline conservative former MeP. Tying the last of these to the 
data in Table 4, where OĽaNO has a score of 0.66 for defence of traditional values—
which is striking for an anti-establishment party—points to the fact that Matovič’s 
party was able to draw in some support from some socially conservative voters that, 
along with Sme Rodina whose leader Boris Kollár frequently emphasized his attach-
ment to conservative social values during the campaign, contributed to the Christian 
Democratic Movement’s (KDH’s) inability to cross the 5 percent threshold.
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Change of Direction, but Continuation of a Trend
Whilst OĽaNO was able to frame the campaign and mobilize voters, other parties 
struggled. By 2020, Fico had ceased to be an asset and was more of a liability to his 
party. He ran unsuccessfully for the country’s presidency in 2014, when he was 
defeated by andrej Kiska. Three years later, during the disputes over nominations to 
the Constitutional Court, he made clear his own interest in serving as president of 
that judicial body, but lack of support from President Kiska and MPs from other 
parties scuppered his chances. Both of these examples signalled a desire to move on 
to a new role, but both attempts were unsuccessful.
Implicated in many of the scandals of the past few years and tainted in particular 
by the Kuciak and Kušnírová murders, Smer-SD embarked on a threefold strategy to 
reverse its slide in the polls and to try to secure victory. Taking a leaf out of the mar-
keting handbook, in an attempt to distance itself from its past the party went for a 
rebrand in autumn 2019, calling itself ‘Nový Smer’ (New Smer). Moreover, to help 
signal this change, the party decided to place Pellegrini at the top of its candidate list, 
with the once-dominant figure of Slovak politics (who remained as party leader), 
Robert Fico, playing more of a supporting role. During the campaign Pellegrini 
promised “responsible change,” a message repeated on billboards and in TV adverts. 
Other campaigning material contrasted the qualified pilot Pellegrini as the only one 
capable of guiding Slovakia, encapsulated in another prominent slogan: “many can-
didates [for the post of prime minister], but only one premier” accompanied on the 
billboard by a picture of a confident-looking Pellegrini.
In addition to this side of the campaign conducted in (relatively) more positive 
tones, the party also pumped out negative campaign messages, particularly using its 
social media platforms, especially facebook. Research indicated that on social media 
Smer-SD ran by some margin the most negative campaign.35 The party lambasted the 
opposition parties deploying its oft-used label “zlepenec” (a glued together hack job) 
indicating that any government put together by the opposition parties was likely to be 
messy and disputatious. But crucially the party chose to direct a lot of its fire in the 
campaign at the newly formed party Za Ľudí and its leader the former president 
Kiska. as Figure 1 shows, at the beginning of the campaign in early 2020, Za Ľudí 
was running second to Smer-SD at around 10 percent in the opinion polls, making 
Kiska the probable alternative prime minister to Pellegrini. Smer-SD seized on 
Kiska’s comments on immigration, which seemed to indicate a tolerant and welcom-
ing stance. In response, Smer-SD used facebook ads to suggest the choice before 
voters was ten thousand immigrants under Kiska or free school meals and more doc-
tors under Smer-SD. Moreover, Smer-SD’s attacks on Kiska were aided by a promi-
nent news story in the final weeks of the campaign centred around grainy video 
footage seemingly implicating the former president in a dodgy property deal, an 
accusation Kiska denied.
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Smer-SD’s campaign, however, lacked the effort and energy of its past triumphs, 
eschewing the large-scale pre-planned rallies that had characterized their efforts in 
previous elections.36
With Smer-SD’s support not bouncing back and the election rapidly approaching, 
the party was keen to broadcast its left-wing credentials. With the acquiescence of its 
coalition ally, the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the far-right ĽSNS led by Marian 
Kotleba, Smer-SD called an extraordinary session of parliament during the official 
election campaign and sought to push through increases to pensions and child bene-
fit, combined with a cut in charges for motorists in an attempt to shore up support 
with its core voters.
Mobilization and Degrees of Cooperation
Being a junior partner in a coalition often damages the chances of that party at 
subsequent elections.37 The 2016–2020 government in Slovakia was no exception to 
this general trend. Both the Slovak National Party (SNS) and Most-Híd were tainted 
by their participation in the Smer-SD led government, not just by the scandals sur-
rounding the government, especially the Kuciak and Kušnírová murders, but also the 
decision to be in a coalition with each other. SNS struggled. Part of this stemmed 
from the party leader andrej Danko who had become the butt of jokes and plagia-
rism accusations and who performed poorly during the TV debates. SNS’s billboards 
proclaiming “We don’t promise changes, we carry them out” and a manifesto stress-
ing their defence of the Slovak nation38 were not enough to halt the slide. But part 
of SNS’s woes was linked to the fundamentals of Slovak politics. SNS had long been 
able to project itself as the country’s nationalist party. By 2020, however, it faced 
opponents fighting for this ideological ground. Not only had ĽSNS led by Marian 
Kotleba burst through in 2016 with 8 percent of the vote (and looked set to win at 
least the same amount again in 2020), but a former justice minister and the man who 
came third in the 2019 presidential elections, Štefan Harabin, formed his own new 
party, Homeland (Vlasť), which received the endorsement of the long-time SNS 
leader, Ján Slota. Neither SNS nor Vlasť, however, made it over the 5 percent thresh-
old themselves, but combined they mustered more than 6 percent of the vote.
The split of the Slovak national vote was also mirrored on the ethnic Hungarian 
side of politics. at least one ethnic Hungarian party (representing the tenth of the 
population of the country that was ethnically Hungarian) had been in the Slovak 
parliament since the establishment of democracy. But by the autumn of 2019, with 
elections rapidly approaching it was clear that there was a chance that no Hungarian 
party would make it. Negotiations began between representatives of Most-Híd, the 
Party of the Hungarian Community, and others. an agreement appeared to be reached 
but soon fell apart. In the election, two groupings ran, Most-Híd and the alliance of 
the Hungarian Community. as with the ethnic Slovak nationalists of SNS and Vlasť, 
neither of these parties by themselves managed to cross the 5 percent threshold, but 
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combined they won 6 percent of the vote. The aggregate total of votes cast for Slovak 
nationalists and ethnic Hungarians (12 percent) that fell below the threshold consti-
tute a major part of the 28 percent of Slovak voters who cast their ballots for parties 
that were not represented in the new parliament: the largest share in Slovakia’s dem-
ocratic history. another major component of that 28 percent lies with the Progressive 
Slovakia–Together coalition.
Novelty and Cooperation
The coalition of two new parties, Progressive Slovakia (PS) and Together 
(Spolu), polled 6.96 percent of the vote, which was higher than SaS (6.22 percent) 
and Za Ľudí (5.77 percent), both of which entered parliament and the new govern-
ment. Slovak electoral law, however, sets a 7 percent threshold for coalitions of two 
parties, meaning PS-Spolu fell just 926 votes short of achieving parliamentary rep-
resentation. Its degree of success, but ultimate failure to secure seats in parliament 
by a slim margin, owed something to the fundamental factors shaping Slovak poli-
tics, but much to its campaign. Our poll indicated nearly a fifth (19.1 percent) of all 
voters who switched parties during the campaign were originally planning to cast 
their ballots for PS-Spolu, a much higher figure than for any other electoral subject.
PS and Spolu held their separate founding congresses in early 2018. Both parties’ 
platforms stressed liberal, centrist, pro-european and internationalist standpoints, 
although of the two, PS’s liberalism leant more to the left and was geared more 
towards liberalism on social questions. although initially promoting different candi-
dates in the 2019 presidential election, they united behind PS’s Deputy Chairwoman, 
Zuzana Čaputová, who went from being a largely unknown lawyer and environmen-
tal activist to becoming president, defeating Smer-SD’s candidate in the run-off. a 
formal PS-Spolu electoral coalition followed that up two months later by winning the 
most votes in the european Parliament elections.39
The larger coalescence of non-Smer-SD forces that swung behind Čaputová in the 
run-off showed the merits of cooperation and had echoes of the coalition of forces 
that united to defeat Mečiar back in the 1990s. It was perhaps no surprise, therefore, 
that as Slovakia geared up for the 2020 elections there was much talk of cementing a 
bloc of parties in a formal coalition. although eventually a non-aggression pact was 
signed, it fell well short of a formal coalition, merely indicating the likely parties 
who would be involved in a non–Smer-SD government. arguably, the key decision 
for the ultimate fate of PS-Spolu, however, was the one made by Kiska.
Rumours had circulated for years that the former president would form a new 
party and in September 2019 Kiska’s Za Ľudí held its founding congress. In a similar 
vein to PS-Spolu and the pitch of other new parties across the region, Za Ľudí offered 
voters not just novelty and anti-corruption appeals40 but also the celebrity and exper-
tise of its leader. Like PS-Spolu, ideologically Kiska’s party projected itself as inter-
nationalist and pro-european, albeit with a more centre-right moderate Christian 
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Democratic appeal. The similarity of the type of voters PS-Spolu and Za Ľudí was 
not lost on the leaders of the former.41
PS-Spolu and Za Ľudí ran different types of campaigns. The former opted to go 
on the offence. Three decisions of PS-Spolu, however, did not have the desired effect. 
Firstly, the party chose to focus much of its fire on the threat from the far right. In 
early 2020, Kotleba’s party appeared to be on an upward trajectory. PS-Spolu orga-
nized demonstrations at ĽSNS rallies and in the leaders’ TV debates Spolu’s leader 
Miroslav Beblavý directed many of his attacks at Kotleba. although appealing to the 
PS-Spolu’s socially liberal base, this strategy contrasted starkly with Matovič’s 
clearer focus on Fico and Smer-SD. Secondly, during the extraordinary session of 
parliament, a few of the PS-Spolu MPs (who had been elected on different party lists 
in 2016) took the lead in attacking the government’s proposals. The backing of 
Kotleba’s contingent for Smer-SD’s proposals was used by PS-Spolu as evidence of 
the nascent and potential post-election coalition. But it was the PS-Spolu members’ 
actions in parliament involving an all-night vigil blocking the podium and thereby 
stopping the debate in the chamber, which grabbed the headlines. This stunt seemed 
more out of the Matovič handbook, but whilst PS-Spolu camped in parliament in 
their pyjamas, OĽaNO’s leader appeared more prime ministerial by offering to bro-
ker a solution. Thirdly, drawing on their success in the presidential and eP elections, 
but also aware of the criticism often made of liberal parties that they are too focused 
on the café culture of the capital,42 PS-Spolu engaged in an energetic campaign to 
visit every town, village, and hamlet in the country. although that campaign made 
for a stream of good images on the party’s social media feeds, it meant less effort was 
placed in mobilizing its core vote amongst the young in the main urban centres. The 
evidence here is less clear-cut, but it is striking that OĽaNO’s mopped up 35.1 per-
cent of the support of first-time voters compared to 15.4 percent for PS-Spolu.43
In contrast, Za Ľudí ran a much more defensive campaign. The party did promote 
its slogan “heads high” on billboards across the country with the pictures of various 
prominent players in Za Ľudí accompanied by the name of the local town, but thanks 
to the attacks on Kiska by Smer-SD and the allegations of murky dealings mentioned 
above, the party had to spend a significant slice of its time simply defending its leader.
The campaign of both parties sent out signals that fed into a perennial subplot of 
every election in Slovakia’s democratic history: who will cross the threshold and 
how will this shape the options for a governing coalition? In recent elections, this 
debate has been spiced up by the fourteen-day moratorium on polling, making it 
harder to know the latest trends, although the results of private polls conducted by 
the main voting agencies were leaked during the fortnight before polling in 2020. 
SaS appeared vulnerable, but its market liberal base was mobilized and augmented 
by its pitch in the last few days of the campaign, that—as one of their prominent 
slogans went—without SaS “a government of the right cannot be created.” The exit 
poll indicated that Za Ľudí’s main pool of support came from its anti-corruption cre-
dentials (30.3 percent) combined with the appeal of its leader (25.8 percent), but it 
may have been pushed over (or at least towards) the 5 percent threshold thanks to a 
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slice of the party’s voters (3.9 percent) casting their ballots for Za Ľudí in order that 
it did not fall below the threshold.44
New Parties: Voter Loyalty and Novel Appeal
Discussion of Za Ľudí and PS-Spolu highlights the role new parties play in the 
evolution of party systems. The appeal of new parties45 has been seen across Central 
and eastern europe as a powerful motor of politics luring voters from their existing 
party homes to newer alternatives. To what extent do the 2020 elections confirm the 
appeal of the new? First we need to know what voters consider to be new—a ques-
tion that very few surveys have ever asked. Studies of new party emergence and 
success tend to engage in discussion about what constitutes newness, but they 
neglect to ask the voters whether they consider parties to be new. In our poll, we 
asked voters whether they considered parties were new or old on a five-point scale 
ranging from 1 (it is definitely a new party) to 5 (it is definitely not a new party). 
The results confirm that voters saw the parties founded in 2018 or 2019 (Za Ľudí, 
PS-Spolu, Dobrá Voľba, and Vlasť) as new. The results also showed that when it 
comes to parties, “new” has a relatively short life span. all parties formed before 
2010, were no longer seen as new by voters. The results also showed a notable dif-
ference in the various party attempts at rebranding. an updated logo and informal 
appellation of “new” to the name of Smer-SD on billboards (but not on the ballot) 
did not have any apparent effect on convincing voters of the party’s newness. In 
contrast, a reconfiguration of the longstanding Party of the Hungarian Community 
into the alliance of the Hungarian Community (MKS to MKÖ) persuaded some 
voters that they were voting for a new entity. For those MKÖ voters, however, new-
ness was far less important in generating support for the party than was its long roots 
in the Hungarian community.
as Table 4 shows, the desire for something different that motivated support for 
many of Slovakia’s new parties and some of its slightly older ones (especially 
OĽaNO) reflects a long dynamic in Slovakia’s political party system. The 2020 elec-
tions gave Slovakia arguably the youngest political party system in europe (when 
party longevity is weighted by party electoral performance) and one of the youngest 
in any of the world’s stable democracies. Nor has Slovakia’s fountain of youth run 
dry: the poor electoral performance of Smer-SD led to the creation of a new break-
away political party called Voice-Social Democracy (Hlas-SD) under former prime 
minister Pellegrini. as Figure 1 shows, Hlas-SD started its life near the top of the 
polls, largely (if not exclusively) at the expense of the older Smer-SD (which itself is 
not even two decades old), and by the year’s end was comfortably the most popular 
party in the country.
Slovakia’s constant churn of party institutions mirrors frequent shifts in voter 
preferences. even extremely conservative estimates suggest that in every single elec-
tion more than one-fifth of all voters have changed their political choice, a level of 
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volatility that has risen in the most recent two elections to nearly one-third. While it 
is hard to know what is going on in the choices of individual voters, we can string 
together public opinion polls that ask voters whom they voted for in previous elec-
tions—a method that is surprisingly robust46—to produce the map of voter flows 
over the four parliamentary elections held in Slovakia in the last decade. Figure 2 
Figure 2
Voter flow between political parties in Slovakia by period of  
origin, 2010–2020
Source: Focus exit Polls (2010, 2012, 2016, 2020); Haughton and Deegan-Krause, 2020. Line widths 
show approximate amounts of overall flow based on voters’ self-reported vote in previous elections.
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shows those flows in schematic form, grouping parties into successive waves (and 
ignoring the significant differences among parties in those waves) and showing voter 
flows greater than 10 percent of a party’s total vote with lines that are approximately 
proportional to the size of the voter flow. The most obvious pattern is the sustained 
step-by-step shift away from parties established before 2010 toward new parties. 
Slightly more subtle, but equally important, is the shift in voters away from the new 
parties, most often toward still newer parties. These newer parties not only draw vot-
ers from the wells of nonvoters and those who had supported established parties, but 
also from previously new parties. In fact the changing preferences exhibited by 
Slovakia’s voters are notable not only for their magnitude but for their tendency 
almost always to favour newer parties over older ones. Figure 2 demonstrates the 
rarity of significant shifts from newer to older parties by marking these with dotted 
lines. These appear only four times and played relatively marginal roles in the coun-
try’s political dynamic. even the sudden growth of Wave 2 parties (born in 2012 and 
by 2020 dominated by OĽaNO) partially at the expense of Wave 3 parties (born in 
2016) does not shift the overall pattern. In 2020, most voters who changed their pref-
erence opted for newer parties than the one they had voted for previously.
Conclusion
The 2020 elections demonstrated both continuities and change in party politics in 
Slovakia. While the results highlighted the enduring role of societal divisions (such 
as ethnicity) and institutional factors (such as the electoral system) in shaping the 
country’s politics, the results also underlined changes in the nature of party competi-
tion in Slovakia and across the region. although left–right socio-economic differ-
ences and value divisions mattered (between conservative/national on the one hand 
and liberal/cosmopolitan on the other), themes related to governance were important 
in shaping voter choice. Indeed, it is helpful to conceive of a third “clean” versus 
“corrupt” dimension of politics to explain how parties, especially new parties, pro-
ject themselves against those in power. In the battle between dominance and innova-
tion,47 the use of such themes strengthens the hands of the challengers and can have 
a significant effect in party systems like Slovakia with weak levels of partisanship. 
Moreover, the results underscored the importance of campaign strategies in mobiliz-
ing and converting voters in a fluid party landscape, showing in particular the power 
of framing an election around anti-corruption appeals. above all, the results of the 
2020 election in Slovakia underlined the ramifications of choices, not just the 
choices of individual voters on election day, but also the strategic and tactical deci-
sions of politicians over their pitch to the electorate and whether to collaborate with 
like-minded parties or go it alone. a different decision by Kiska over whether to 
form a party, for instance, and the complexion of the post-election parliament and 
government would have been (markedly) different. In party systems like Slovakia 
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with a large number of parties, low party identification and high electoral volatility, 
the impact of seemingly small contingent decisions can be significant.
The election led to Smer-SD’s removal from power and replacement by a new 
four-party coalition (OĽaNO, SaS, Sme Rodina, and Za Ľudí) with a command of 95 
of the 150 seats in parliament. History offered pessimistic precedents for the new 
government. another four-party coalition had removed Fico from power in 2010, but 
failed to last the course, brought down by disagreements over how to respond to the 
eurozone crisis. Immediately on taking power, the new Matovič-led government 
faced the challenge of the coronavirus pandemic, a challenge that quickly exposed 
tensions within the coalition, and called into question its competence and ability to 
create coherent, stable governance.
In addition to putting a new government in place, the election reshaped the play-
ing field for many of the main actors. It exposed the winners to new internal tensions 
and public scrutiny. The challenge for OĽaNO was one of cohesion given both the 
sizeable defections it experienced in its two previous parliamentary terms combined 
with the demands and compromises of governing and the difficulty of delivering an 
anti-corruption agenda in office.
Moreover, as coalition negotiations began, Kiska publicized his health problems 
and chose to step back from the running of his party, provoking a leadership election 
and posing questions about Za Ľudí’s future direction and survival. For others, espe-
cially Smer-SD, defeat opened up an internal fracture and produced an overt rupture. 
The new offspring, Hlas-SD was catapulted almost immediately to first place in the 
opinion polls. By 2021, the oldest party in Slovakia’s parliament, Smer-SD, was 
barely two decades old and four-fifths of the deputies in parliament represented par-
ties that gained parliamentary representation in 2010 or later. It was a new parliament 
in more ways than one.
Where newness mattered was in voter movements. Showing similarities to other 
countries in the region voters tend to go from new to newer parties and are far less 
likely to return to the more established parties. Once released, the newness genie can 
be difficult to put back into the bottle. In one perspective, such surface-level change 
seems unimportant as long as the constantly changing suite of parties is representing 
the same underlying core interests and value. However, the changing of the guard 
still matters because every change in direction and every new party requires time to 
build the stable relationship and linkage with voters that make democratic contesta-
tion effective and tend to generate good quality public policy.
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